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LET THE HOLDER BEWARE!
A PROBLEMATIC ANALYSIS OF THE
FTC HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE
As price increases continue to outdistance wage increases, America's reliance
upon credit has become a dependence: "The day of the cash-and-carry transaction
is gone. Buying now and paying later has become a way of life for all Americans
except the very rich." In view of this dependence, it is important that a con-
sumer's power to bargain with a merchant and with the subsequent purchaser of a
consumer credit instrument be preserved. However, application of the holder in
due course doctrine in consumer transactions has distressingly tipped the balance of
bargaining power in favor of creditors. The author analyzes this problem as well as
the substantive and procedural problems caused by the FTC'S solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
OF ALL THE TECHNIQUES used by creditors in consumer credit trans-
actions to insulate themselves from consumers' claims or defenses,
few have generated as much interest and controversy as the "Holder In Due
Course" (HDC) doctrine.2 Consider the predicament of a consumer who
purchases a defectively manufactured automobile or appliance on an install-
ment contract. The defect in the product quickly renders it nonfunctional,
but the merchant refuses to repair or replace the item. The consumer tries
to withhold payment on the installment contract, only to be informed that
his contract has been sold to a third party. The third party purchaser asserts
that as the purchaser of a presumably valid contract, the HDC doctrine
affords him a legal right to collect payment on the contract irrespective of
the condition of the merchandise. Thus, the consumer is bound to continue
paying for a defective product.
1. B. CLARK & J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CASES § 1, at 1 (1972).
2. See generally Countryman, The Holder in Due Course and Other Anachronisms in Con-
sumer Credit, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1973); Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1097-1100 (1954); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445, '459-73 (1968); Kripke, Chattel Paper
as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209, 1215-16
(1950); Consumer Credit Symposium: Developments in the Law: Finance Companies and Banks
as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 389
(1961); Comment, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder in Due Course"
in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 90 (1969); Note, Consumer Financ-
ing, Negotiable Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial
Dilemma, 55 CORNELL L. Rv. 611 (1970); Note, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Pur-
chases, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1972); Comment, Financing Consumer Goods Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Installment Buyers and Defaulting Sellers, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 513
(1970); Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing,
1968 WIS. L. REv. 505.
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This scenario illustrates an unfortunate ramification of the well estab-
lished HDC doctrine. 3 Simply stated, the doctrine immunizes the sub-
sequent holder of a negotiable instrument 4 from the personal defenses the
purchaser of the defective product could have maintained against the origi-
nal holder of the note, provided the subsequent holder took the instrument
for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defenses against it or
claim to it.5 In response to the harsh consequences of the application of the
doctrine in consumer credit transactions, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) promulgated its "Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses"
Trade Regulation Rule.6 This Rule, commonly referred to as the "Holder in
Due Course Rule," protects consumers by making merchants bear the loss for
defective mechandise, poor services, and merchants' misrepresentations. The
regulation became effective on May 14, 1976. This Note will examine the
various problems emanating from the FTC's HDC Rule and its proposed
amendment, paying particular attention to the Rule's methodology, the
FTC's authority to promulgate such an expansive regulation, and the Rule's
overall effect on consumer credit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The HDC Doctrine
The purposes underlying the HDC doctrine were first articulated in the
eighteenth century 7 by the King's Bench of England in Miller v. Race.8
In Miller, the court held that when a bank note was stolen and later sold to
a good faith purchaser who was unaware of the theft, the purchaser of the
note would prevail over all parties claiming the note. Because bank notes
3. For a detailed discussion of the holder in due course concept, see W. BRTTON, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES §§ 98-124 (2d ed. 1961).
4. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) requires that a negotiable instrument
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no
other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer except
as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
(2) A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(a) a "draft" ("bill of exchange") if it is an order;
(b) a "check" if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand;
(c) a "certificate of deposit" if it is an acknowledgment by a bank of receipt of
money with an engagement to repay it;
(d) a "note" if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
U.C.C. § 3-104.
5. The major statutory provisions concerning the holder in due course doctrine are codified
in sections 3-301 to 307 of the UCC.
6. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-.2 (1976).
7. See J. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAV 182-83
(1955).
8. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758).
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were "treated as money," 9 the court reasoned that any other result would
have hampered commerce. 10
The primary goal in formulating the HDC doctrine was to precipitate the
growth of commerce by assuring liquidity of commercial paper." Liquidity
makes consumer credit transactions more common, thereby enabling mer-
chants to increase sales volume as goods become available to more buyers.
Furthermore, liquidity enables merchants to sell their consumer paper at a
discount to lenders if the installment sales process causes cash flow prob-
lems.
Courts in the United States adopted the HDC doctrine on the premise
that the free flow of commerce was a desirable goal in the advancement of a
commercial economy. 12 These same principles were incorporated, in part,
in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and its predecessor, the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law.13
The Uniform Commercial Code is now the major statutory source of the
HDC doctrine in consumer transactions. 14  Under the UCC, a subsequent
holder of a consumer credit instrument qualifies as a HDC if he takes the
instrument for "value," 15 "in good faith," 16 and "without notice that it is
overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against it or claim to
it."1 7 A HDC is entitled to full repayment of the instrument. More impor-
9. Id. at 402.
10. Id. See also Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper,
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177, 183-85.
11. See J. STRONG, PROMISsoRY NoTEs 13 (7th ed. 1878).
12. For a review of judicial development of the holder in due course concept, see J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 14-8, at
479-84 (1972).
13. See Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code, 49 Nw. U.L. REv.
417 (1954).
14. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 12, at §§ 14-1 to 14-6.
15. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1) (a). The UCC provides:
A holder takes the instrument for value
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or
that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument
otherwise than by legal process; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an
antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is
due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable
commitment to a third person.
16. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1) (b). UCC section 1-201 (19) defines good faith as "honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned."
17. U.C.C. § 3-302 (1) (c). Section 1-201 (25) defines notice:
A person has "notice" of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists.
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tantly, he takes the instrument free from all "claims and defenses" of any
party to the instrument with whom he has not dealt. To the consumer this
means that if the subsequent holder of the credit note is a HDC, he can
enforce the note against the consumer even though the consumer would
have a valid defense against the original seller.
Those defending the application of the HDC doctrine to current con-
sumer transactions cite for support the realities and practical needs of the
consumer credit market. 18 It has been argued that despite the adverse ef-
fect upon a consumer whose promissory note is sold to a HDC, the practical
needs of merchants who extend consumer credit argue for the application of
the HDC doctrine to the sale of consumer paper. The desirability of HDC
status for anyone regularly purchasing consumer paper from a merchant is
obvious. The subsequent holder takes a greatly reduced risk of nonrecovery,
while the consumer assumes the risk of defective manufacture, or merchant
misconduct or insolvency.
The advantage taken of the HDC doctrine by banks, credit unions, and
other financing institutions has resulted in an expanded consumer goods in-
dustry, permitting more families the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of our
industrial society. 19 Notwithstanding the utility of the HDC doctrine in
consumer credit financing, however, its application has often resulted in
harsh and unjust results for consumers. 20
18. The anticipated consequences of abrogating the holder in due course doctrine in con-
stmer transactions has been described as follows:
Lenders will be forced to litigate many issues which have no relationship to the
normal risks of lending money but instead are directly related to the quality of the
products or services sold or the performance of warranties by the seller. To date,
we know of no financial institution which has included such costs in its rate calcula-
tions. However, if enforcing warranties or guaranteeing product performance is to
be forced upon financial institutions as a cost factor, you can rest assured that those
additional costs will be passed on to the consumers of our products through in-
creased consumer interest rates or through restrictions on the availability of con-
sumer credit or both.
Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Requiem, Revival, or Reformation,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 503, 528 n.133 (1975).
19. In August, 1974, consumer finance companies held $38.9 billion in installment
credit. The extent to which Americans presently rely upon installment credit is apparent if the
1974 figure is compared to the $5.3 billion finance companies held in December, 1950. NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 35
(1973) [hereinafter cited as NCCF REPORT].
20. See, e.g., W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE 3-6
(1968).
Instances in which a subsequent holder of consumer paper established HDC status and
foreclosed the consumer's right to assert a claim or defense against the HDC demonstrate the
problem. For example, consumers signed installment contracts in payment for membership in a
health club. The club went out of business with approximately fifteen hundred customers still
making payments on the contracts which had been sold to a third party. These consumers were
obligated to continue payments on their contracts to the third party who had HDC status. 40
Fed. Reg. 53,513 n. 10 (1975). In another case, a consumer contracted to buy meat through a
supply plan on a deferred payment schedule. The quality of the food delivered was inferior to
[Vol. 27:977
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B. Judicial Relief
A new method of separating the consumer's obligation to pay from the
merchant's duty to perform has evolved as a result of the credit industry's
discontent with growing resistance to the HDC doctrine in consumer credit
transactions. 21  The merchant, remaining independent of the loan transac-
tion, merely directs the consumer to a third-party lender for an installment
loan. The consumer then uses the money from the loan to finance his pur-
chase from the merchant. Typically, the purchased item is employed as col-
lateral for the indebtedness. As a result of these techniques, the creditor has
HDC status, and the obligation to repay the loan is not subject to claims or
defenses arising out of the consumer sales transaction.
Recently, a number of courts confronted with collection actions by sub-
sequent holders of consumer paper have tried to mitigate ihe harsh impact
of the HDC doctrine in consumer transactions.2 2  Most of the recoveries are
based upon the close relationship between the merchant and the subsequent
holder. Under this "close connectedness" doctrine 3 a holder of a consumer
credit instrument loses his status as a HDC if he is too closely connected to
the merchant from whom he purchases the instrument. 2
The landmark decision applying the "close connectedness" test in order
to deny HDC status in a consumer credit transaction was Unico v. Owen.25
In Unico, the consumers entered into an agreement to purchase more than
one hundred record albums and a stereo, executing a promissory note to the
merchant, Universal Stereo Corporation. When Universal Stereo discon-
tinued delivery after delivering only twelve albums, the consumers stopped
that agreed upon and the monthly shipments ceased. The consumer attempted to withhold
payment only to be informed that his contract had been sold to a third party, who, as a HDC,
was entitled to repayment. W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, supra at 17.
21. NCCF REPORT, supra note 19, at 35. See generally Note, Direct Loan Financing of
Consumer Purchases, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1972).
22. See generally Comment, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a
"Holder in Due Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 90 (1969).
23. See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Jones v. Approved Bankcredit Corp., 256 A.2d 739 (Del. 1969); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101,
232 A.2d 405 (1967); Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (1962);
American Plan Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
24. The earliest case to apply this theory was Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark.
1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). In that case, the consumer entered into a conditional sales con-
tract, drawing a promissory note as a consideration for the purchase of an automobile. The
finance company, which had purchased the note from the dealer, brought an action in replevin
in response to the consumer's default on the note. The consumer asserted as a defense that the
dealer had committed fraud. The court held that although the finance company had not been
actually aware of the fraud, it had sufficiently participated in the underlying consumer transac-
tion by supplying the forms, and so did not qualify as a HDC of the consumer note.
25. 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). The Unico decision has even been used to instruct
students in judicial treatment of the holder in due course doctrine. See, e.g., R. NoRDsTROM &
A. CLOVIS, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER 341 (1972).
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making payments on the notes and Unico, the finance company which
purchased the notes from Universal Stereo, sued. The court did not deem
Unico a HDC because Unico was too closely connected with the dealer's
business. 26 The court observed that Unico was created for the purpose of
financing Universal Stereo and "not only had a thorough knowledge of the
nature and method of operation of Universal's business, but also exercised
extensive control over it" 2 7 by supplying the form for the contract and note
used by Universal.
In response to the judicially created close connectedness test, a second
method was adopted by creditors to separate the consumer's duty to pay
from the merchant's duty to perform. This method involves the use of a
"waiver of defense" clause. 28  The consumer signs an installment contract
which contains a waiver provision insulating any subsequent holder of the
note from defenses to payment which the consumer may be able to assert
against the merchant. If the requirements of good faith and lack of notice are
met, the subsequent holder may assert rights analogous to a HDC. The
clause, in effect, provides the subsequent holder with the privileges of a
HDC through a contractual provision. The UCC expressly allows the use of
such provisions in commercial transactions. 29
This subterfuge, however, has not escaped judicial notice. In Rehurek v.
Chrysler Credit Corp.,30 the Florida District Court of Appeals held that the
defendant, to whom an automobile dealer assigned a retail installment con-
tract containing a waiver of defense clause, did not take an assignment in
good faith because it furnished the forms, investigated the buyer's credit
rating, and generally had a close working relationship with the seller, and
therefore, could not rely on the buyer's waiver of defenses. The court
further concluded that any boiler plate waiver of defense provision must fail
as against public policy.
26. 50 N.J. at 115, 232 A.2d at 413.
27. Id.
28. A typical waiver of defense clause states:
If the seller should assign the contract in good faith to a third party, the buyer
shall be precluded as against such third party from attacking the validity of the
contract on grounds of fraud, duress, mistake, want of consideration ....
NCCF REPORT, supra note 19, at 35.
29. UCC section 9-206 (1) provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers
or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not
assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller
or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good
faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which
may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of one transaction
signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement makes such an agree-
ment.
30. 262 So. 2d 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
[Vol. 27:977
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE
Some jurisdictions deny an assignee of consumer paper HDC status by
refusing to treat retail sales contracts as negotiable instruments. In Geiger
Finance Co. v. Graham, 9 a finance company sued to collect on a consumer
contract, claiming to be a HDC, and therefore not subject to the consumer's
defense of failure of consideration. The contract in issue contained the terms
of a promissory note, a conditional sales contract, and a provision purporting
to waive any defense against a subsequent holder which the consumer could
have asserted against the merchant. The merchant assigned the contract to a
finance company shortly after it had been signed by the consumer. The
court ruled that the finance company was not a HDC because a contract
containing both a promissory note and the terms of a conditional sales
agreement is not a negotiable instrument under Georgia law. 32 As a result,
the assignee of a consumer credit contract in Georgia takes the contract
subject to any defenses that the consumer could have asserted against the
merchant.
A unique decision of the California Supreme Court 33 held that a con-
sumer could bring an action for rescission against a finance company that
was a subsequent holder of his notes if he could show the existence of a
close relationship between the merchant and the subsequent holder. This
decision was the first to give a consumer the right to assert his claims and
defenses on a consumer credit instrument without having to wait for the
subsequent holder to attempt to enforce the instrument. It would represent
a major advance if the same procedure were allowed under other theories of
recovery, and there appear to be no theoretical obstacles to that course.
These cases are representative of an increasing movement by the
judiciary to scrutinize and reevaluate the necessity for and impact of the
HDC doctrine in consumer credit transactions. 34 The courts have been lim-
ited in dealing with the problem because they have had to choose between
two innocent parties-the subsequent holder and the consumer-in impos-
ing liability. Denial of HDC status to the subsequent holder would result in
an economic loss to a holder who may have purchased a note in good faith
31. 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971). For a detailed discussion of this decision, see
Commercial Law-Conditional Sales Contract Held Not a Negotiable Instrument Under the
U.C.C., 8 GA. ST. B.J. 400 (1972).
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-3-105. With very few variations, the 1962 official draft of the
UCC has been adopted by Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 109A-3-101 to 109A-3--805 (1973).
33. Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
34. These decisions reflect the courts' risk allocation perception that creditors are in a better
position to absorb and reallocate losses. As one court stated:
We think the buyer-Mr. & Mrs. General Public-should have some protection
somewhere along the line. We believe the finance company is better able to bear
the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and in a far better position to
protect his interests against unscrupulous and insolvent dealers.
Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). See also, Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
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and without notice. Because this approach would eliminate any protection
for subsequent holders of consumer paper, the purchase of consumer paper
would become unattractive and risky. On the other hand, rigid application of
HDC status to all subsequent holders would be inequitable to the con-
sumer, particularly when the subsequent holder and merchant were in-
volved in a cooperative effort.
The equitable standards adopted by the courts have achieved a neces-
sary flexibility by protecting consumers in certain cases, yet recognizing
HDC status when the subsequent holder was not too closely involved with
the original merchant. Despite the promise shown by these emerging judi-
cial amendments to the HDC doctrine in certain jurisdictions, however, a
commercial society demands a more uniform and predictable rule. For this
reason, legislative action appears to provide a more workable solution to the
problem.
C. State Legislation
In response to the growing concern for consumer protection, there has
developed a trend to equalize the positions of parties in installment sales
transactions through the use of state statutes.3 5  Many states have expressly
limited or eliminated the HDC doctrine in the consumer credit area.3 6 A
number of states have prohibited the utilization of negotiable instruments in
consumer installment sales transactions.3 7 The value of this type of statute
is limited, however, because it usually does not apply to a consumer credit
transaction in which a waiver of defense clause is utilized to foreclose a
consumer's defense against the subsequent holder.3 8  Other states have es-
tablished a mandatory "complaint period" during which the consumer may
reconsider his purchase agreement prior to the protection of HDC status
being granted to the subsequent holder.3 9 In these states, the subsequent
35. The FTC in a statement regarding the basis and purpose of the Act noted: "Some forty
jurisdictions have enacted legislation bearing on foreclosures of equities in installment sales." 40
Fed. Reg. 53,508 (1975).
36. For a discussion of these statutes, see Willier, Need For Preservation of Buyers'
Defenses-State Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 132 (1972).
37. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255, § 12C (West 1959); MD. ANN.. CODE art. 83, §
147 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.14.020
(Supp. 1976).
38. Some states' statutes, however, do prohibit waiver of defense clauses in consumer
credit contracts. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1804.2 West Supp. 1976); HAwII REV. STAT. §
476-18(b)-18(c) (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 10(6), 25A (Supp. 1972). See also
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CREDIT CODE § 2.404, alternative A.
39. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 (1975) (15 day notification period covers all
retail sales); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 262(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (5 day notification
period covers all installment sales except motor vehicles); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 50-207 to
208 (Purdon Supp. 1972) (15 day notification period for home improvement retail installment
sales); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 1402 (Purdon Supp. 1972) (45 day notification period covers all
retail installment sales except home improvement and motor vehicles).
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holder of a consumer contract or note must notify the consumer that the
original merchant has sold the note. The consumer then has a specific time
period in which he may notify the subsequent holder of any related claims
or defenses. Under this type of statute, the consumer reserves the right to
assert any claim or defense raised during the "complaint period" in a sub-
sequent suit for payment. 4
0
Since many states have enacted some form of legislation to limit or
eliminate the abusive use of the HDC doctrine in consumer credit transac-
tions, the question arises whether a federal legislative solution is necessary.
Opponents of any national attempt to moderate the HDC doctrine in con-
sumer transactions contend that the states are best suited to provide the
balanced protection necessary to meet the needs of both the consumers and
the credit industry.41 They further contend that in the normal case the
credit institutions are intrastate businesses and thus the states should be
allowed and are in the best position to regulate and oversee their be-
havior. 42 The rationale behind this viewpoint is the constitutional limitation
on the federal government's power to regulate intrastate commerce.4 3 These
opponents argue that even under the broader federal power to regulate
commerce indicated by the modern interpretation of the commerce clause,"4
any attempt to preempt the legislative endeavors already undertaken by the
majority of the states would be an improper overextension of federal power.
On the other hand, proponents of a national approach emphasize that the
scattergun pattern of state legislation has failed to establish any uniform
standard for dealing with the HDC problem. 45 The crux of their argument
is that although a consumer may be highly protected in one state, he may be
totally unprotected in another. The federal government, through its com-
merce clause power, is the logical instrument for achieving uniformity in
such situations, and thus it, rather than the states, should act.
40. Id.
41. 40 Fed. Reg. 53,521 n.53a (1975).
42. A credit industry representative testifying during the FTC hearing on the HDC Rule,
took the position that the FTC action unnecessarily duplicated state statutes. In re Revised
Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,521 (1975) (statement by James Schintz,
Pennsylvania Independent Automobile Association).
43. It is unlikely that the intrastate commerce argument enunciated by opponents of a uni-
form rule can prevail because of the Supreme Court's expansion of federal commerce power.
Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); U.S. v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45. Proponents of the FTC Rule have emphasized their belief that a comprehensive trade
rule would be uninfluenced by local pressures and would be a major step toward achieving
uniformity. See, e.g., In re Revised Proposed Trade Regulation Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,521
(1975) (Statement by Atlanta Legal Aid Society).
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III. THE FTC HDC RULE
A. History
The Federal Trade Commission had been concerned with the ill effects
of the HDC doctrine in consumer affairs for several years. 46 On January 21,
1971, the FTC took the initial step toward abolishing the HDC doctrine in
consumer transactions by announcing that it was proposing a "Trade Regula-
tion Rule concerning the maintenance and retention of buyers' claims and
defenses in retail consumer installment sales." 47  After a series of public
hearings on the proposed Rule, it became apparent that merchants could
circumvent even a strict HDC rule by arranging direct loans between cre-
ditors and consumers. Therefore, the FTC proposed a revised version of its
Rule on January 5, 1973.48
On November 14, 1975, shortly after having been granted increased
rule-making authority, 49 the FTC promulgated a final Trade Regulation
Rule. 50 With this version of the Rule, the FTC resolved that any action by
a merchant in financing a consumer purchase that makes the consumer's
duty to pay independent of the merchant's duty to perform "constitute[s] an
unfair and deceptive practice." 51  The Rule assures consumers a greater
opportunity to assert claims and defenses that arise from the underlying con-
sumer credit transaction, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, and
fraud, against a subsequent holder of the note.
In adopting this Rule, the FTC did not question the need for the HDC
doctrine to insure the negotiability of certain forms of commerical paper. 52
The agency indicated, however, that it had documented a substantial
46. In 1968, Paul R. Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, indicated during his testimony before
the Senate Subcommittee on Financial Institutions that the FTC recognized the need for
equalization of consumer and credit rights through the elimination of holder in due course
defenses in consumer affairs. Hartman & Walker, The Holder In Due Course Doctrine and the
Consumer, 77 COM. L.J. 116, 122 (1972).
47. FTC News Release, Jan. 21, 1971. The proposed rule was published for comment on
January 26, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 1211 (1971).
48. Revised Proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims
and Defenses §§ 433.1-.4, 38 Fed. Reg. 892 (1973).
49. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 93-637 § 202 (a), (c), (d), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a (Supp. V. 1975)).
50. FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16
C.F.R. § 433.1, .2 (1975).
51. FTC, STAFF GUIDELINES ON TRADE REGULATION RULE CONCERNING PRESERVATION
OF CONSUMERS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as STAFF GUIDELINES].
52. The FTC's desire to retain the holder in due course doctrine in nonconsumer
business transactions is reflected in the following statement of Mary Gardner Jones,
FTC Commissioner, to Robert P. Hartman and H. William Walker, Jr.: "'[T]he
holder in due course doctrine began as a valuable factor in promoting confidence in negotiable
instruments and is still necessary in the area of commercial transactions." Hartman & Walker,
The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77 CoM. L.J. 116, 122 (1972).
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amount of abuse in situations involving the HDC doctrine in consumer
transactions-in particular, conduct such as collusion, affiliation, and refer-
rals between the merchant of consumer goods and subsequent holders of
consumer credit paper. 53 The HDC Rule attempts to protect the consumer
against all of these abuses, reflecting an agency determination that consumer
interest should prevail over commercial needs.
B. Methodology
1. Notice Requirement in Consumer Credit Contracts
The FTC Rule requires merchants connected with any consumer install-
ment sales transaction affecting commerce to insert a prescribed notice in all
instruments of consumer indebtedness. 54 This notice 55 states that any sub-
sequent holder of such credit instrument is subject to all claims and defenses
that could be asserted against the merchant. A merchant's failure to include
the notice in consumers' sales instruments "constitutes an unfair or decep-
tive act or practice within the meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act." 56 A merchant who commits such an unfair or deceptive
practice is exposed to FTC sanction or monetary penalty.
The FTC's Rule, in effect, abrogates the HDC doctrine with respect to
consumer credit transactions involving the sale of notes by merchants. Be-
cause the prescribed notice of the consumer's right to assert claims and de-
fenses against the instrument becomes an integral provision in all contractual
instruments of consumer credit financing, subsequent holders of the contract
do not qualify for HDC status because they could not have taken possession
of the instrument without notice of defenses against it. 5 7 A merchant can-
not sell or assign the credit contract to a subsequent holder without subject-
ing such holder to the same liability that the merchant might have under the
contract.
53. The FTC's Statement of Basis and Purposes issued with the HDC Rule reveals that the
accumulated record contained over 14,000 indications of consumer credit inequities. 40 Fed.
Reg. 53,510 (1975).
54. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
55. The notice must read in at least ten point, boldface type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO
ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER d;F GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT
HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER
BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1977).
56. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 4.
57. See U.C.C. § 3-304. See also text accompanying note 17 supra.
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Even if a merchant sells a consumer note without the prescribed writ-
ten notice, the subsequent holder still may not qualify for HDC status. It is
questionable whether the purchaser of a consumer credit instrument lacking
the prescribed notice can have purchased in "good faith." The UCC defines
"good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 58
The cases, however, clearly apply this criteria using a certain quantum of
subjective insight.5 9 Most sectors of the financing industry, the predomin-
ant purchasers of consumer credit paper, are aware of the FTC HDC Rule
and its notice requirement, as reflected by the industry's mounting opposi-
tion 60 to the proposed amendment to the Rule which would even more
directly involve them. Therefore, it is likely that any attempt by an institu-
tional purchaser of a consumer note to claim HDC status will fail since a
court is likely to impute to it knowledge of the FTC notice requirement.
Thus, the holder could not argue that he took the instrument in good faith
and without notice. The Rule also effectively abolishes the use of waiver of
defense clause provisions in consumer credit instruments, which the UCC
specifically permitted, 6 ' by prohibiting the qualification of the prescribed
notice by any other clause in the instrument.62 Thus, whether a merchant
includes or excludes the notice provision, the subsequent holder is likely to
be denied HDC status.
The FTC's approach is much more radical than judicial efforts to restrict
the HDC doctrine in consumer matters have been. The FTC's HDC Rule,
unlike the common law efforts, is not based upon the intimacy of the rela-
tionship between the subsequent holder and the merchant. The FTC, by
requiring insertion of a prescribed notice in all consumer credit instruments,
has much more broadly abrogated the HDC doctrine in consumer affairs
than has the common law "good faith"-"close connectedness" method.
Under common law, for example, a subsequent holder who neither played
an active role in the underlying consumer credit transaction nor purchased
consumer paper on a regular basis was entitled to HDC privileges. Since the
58. U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
59. These courts have been "impelled for reasons of equity and justice ... to deny holder
in due course status in consumer goods sales cases to those financiers whose involvement with
the seller's business is . . . close." Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 115, 232 A.2d 405, 413 (1967)
(emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., Hearings on the FTC Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Preservation of
Consumer's Claims and Defenses Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement
of Walter W. Vaughan representing the American Bankers Association).
61. U.C.C. § 9-206(1).
62. To avoid manipulative interpretation of the requirement that a consumer credit instru-
ment "contain" the prescribed notice, the FTC has stated that: "Notice is not satisfied if the
text of the Notice is printed in the contract with additional recitals which limit or restrict its
application." STAFF CUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 6.
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promulgation of the HDC Rule, however, this holder cannot achieve HDC
status because he has notice that potential claims or defenses could arise
from the consumer debt instrument.
As an administrative agency, the FTC has the flexibility to promulgate a
broad, yet uniform standard to deal with a problem which the courts recog-
nized, but could not solve. The FTC did not face the dilemma of choosing
between two innocent parties as did the courts, since it could deal with the
HDC doctrine in consumer credit transactions at its initial level-the origi-
nal transaction between the consumer and the merchant. Furthermore, an
FTC rule could have a preventative effect because, unlike a judicial decision
which would deny HDC status to a subsequent holder after the fact, the
HDC Rule's notice requirement puts all parties to a consumer credit trans-
action on notice from the beginning. Instead of having a court choose which
of two innocent parties should bear the loss, the HDC Rule does not result
in direct harm to either innocent party; the subsequent holder has notice
and will likely pay less for the instrument, while the consumer maintains his
claims and defenses.
The FTC Rule also has an advantage over state-imposed legislation be-
cause it provides uniformity in consumer credit. It is especially important to
a society which is both so transient and so intertwined as ours that there be
predictability in commercial affairs. Consumers and purchasers of credit in-
struments should be aware of their rights, and those rights should not vary
from state to state. Only a single national rule can effectively insure uniform
treatment.
2. Purchase Money Loans
In the promulgated version of the HDC Rule, the FTC extended its
application beyond the traditional HDC situation to include "purchase
money loans" 6 3 -- direct loans from a creditor to a consumer in which the
seller plays an active part. Under the FTC's Rule, it is an unfair or decep-
tive trade practice for a merchant to accept the proceeds of a "purchase
money loan" if the loan document does not include the prescribed notice. 64
The insertion of the notice extends liability to the creditor for any claims
that the consumer could bring against the merchant as a result of the con-
sumer transaction.
63. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
64. The Notice must read in at least ten point, boldface type:
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO
ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT
AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL
NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (1977):
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The purchase money loan provision applies to direct loans where a third
party creditor and a merchant are "affiliated" 65 or where the merchant "re-
fers" 66 the consumer to the "creditor" 67 even though the creditor nominally
makes a direct loan to the consumer and takes the wares to be purchased as
collateral. The FTC's affiliation and referral standards are intended to "de-
lineate those business relationships where sellers and creditors engage in
concerted or cooperative conduct to arrange credit for consumers." 68 The
Rule is applicable to those situations where there is a joint activity or con-
certed action between a creditor and a merchant of consumer goods. An
examiration of the affiliation and referral standards is necessary for a broader
understanding of the, purchase money loan provision of the Rule.
a. Affiliation. There are several types of affiliations which will bring cred-
itors and merchants within the scope of the new FTC Rule. 69 The two most
prevalent types are designated as "common control" and "business arrange-
ment." The "common control" criterion applies when creditor and merchant
function as part of the same business entity.70
A "business arrangement" 71 is some formal or informal agreement be-
tween creditor and merchant, either oral, written, or established through a
course of dealing, which contemplates a cooperative or concerted activity
involving the sale of goods or services to consumers or the financing thereof.
The definition of "business arrangement" is broad enough to include agree-
ments between issuers of credit cards and merchants, but this form of affilia-
tion is "specifically exempted from the Rule." 7 2 To clarify the affiliation
concept, the FTC published examples of various business arrangements
65. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
67. The HDC Rule defines creditor as:
A person who, in the ordinary course of business, lends purchase money or finances
the sale of goods or services to consumers on a deferred payment basis; Provided,
such person is not acting, for the purposes of a particular transaction, in the capac-
ity of a credit card issuer.
16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c)(1977).
68. FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy. 41 Fed. Reg. 34,596 (1976).
69. Under the Rule a seller can be affiliated with the creditor "by common control, con-
tract, or business arrangement." FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,525
(1975).
70. An example of this form of relationship is a national automotive finance company which
is created by the parent corporation for the specific purpose of financing its car sales such as the
relationship between General Motors and the General Motors Acceptance Corporation.
71. The HDC Rule defines business arrangement as "[any understanding, procedure,
course of dealing, or arrangement, formal, or informal, between a creditor and a seller, in
connection with the sale of goods or services to consumers or the financing thereof." 16 C.F.R.
§ 433.1( (1977).
72. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 10.
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which fall within the scope of the Rule. 73 The FTC noted that while gener-
ally a creditor and merchant must confer over a particular transaction, every
such communication does not in itself create a business arrangement. For
example, the mere fact that a creditor issues a joint proceeds check to a
merchant and a consumer or that the merchant and creditor must confer in
order to perfect the security agreement under applicable state law does not
establish a business arrangement 74 or contract which would constitute an
affiliation under the Rule.
b. Referral. The "referral" provision is aimed at those situations in which
a seller channels consumers to a specific creditor on "a continuing basis."
75
Unlike the affiliation standard, the referral provision does not contemplate a
preexisting contractual or business arrangement between merchant and cred-
itor. The referral relationship arises from a pattern of cooperative activity
directly related to the arranging of credit. The requisite element of the re-
ferral test is "whether the seller routinely refers his customers" 76 to a
specific creditor.
Differentiating between routine and occasional referrals is a difficult task.
The FTC recognizes that the mere fact that a merchant may suggest credit
sources or otherwise provide information to his customers on this subject
will not by itself trigger application of the Rule. 77 However, when mer-
chant and creditor work together in the ordinary course of business to ar-
range financing for the merchant's customers, the prescribed notice must be
incorporated into the loan contract. There are no specific guidelines to
suggest when a number of occasional referrals crosses into the category of
referrals "on a continuing basis." No formal consideration need pass between
the merchant and creditor. The fact that the merchant and creditor are
73. Examples of various business arrangements which are reached by the rule include:
(1) Maintenance of loan application forms in the office of the seller;
(2) Seller's agreements with creditor to prepare loan documents;
(3) Creditor's referrals of customers to a sales outlet;
(4) Payment of consideration to a seller for furnishing loan customers or to a cre-
ditor for furnishing sales prospects;
(5) Assignment of indirect paper or referral of loan customers to a creditor;
(6) Active creditor participation in a sales program;
(7) Joint advertising efforts;
(8) An agreement to purchase paper on an indirect basis.
FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,595 (1976).
74. National Automobile Dealers, FTC Adv. Ops. No. 763-7007 (June 18, 1976), 3 TRADE
REG. l-1,rm. (CCH) 21,156 (1976).
75. FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,596 (1976).
76. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 15.
77. In the Statement of Enforcement Policy:
Mhe Rule draws the line between situations in which the seller is acting as an
information source or where credit is available and those in which the seller is
arranging credit or serving as a conduit for the creditor.
41 Fed. Reg. 34,596 (1976).
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cooperatively engaging in an effort which is mutually beneficial to their
separate businesses is sufficient. However, once a referral or affiliation rela-
tionship is established, all credit contracts between that creditor and con-
sumers who spend the proceeds at the merchant's establishment must con-
tain the notice. 78
Consider the merchant who has continually referred his customers to a
specific creditor and now wishes to terminate the referral relationship. How
does the merchant do so? According to the FTC, the referral relationship can
be terminated at any time "as long as the termination is genuine and the
seller is not attempting to temporarily avoid the Rule for a few transac-
tions." 79 The merchant must discontinue the referrals and notify the cred-
itor of the termination. The creditor may also terminate the relationship by
notifying the merchant that the relationship is concluded and "by refusing to
place the Notice in his loan contracts with purchasers from that seller." 80
C. Compliance
1. Transactions Requiring the Notice Provision
In general, the burden of compliance with the HDC Rule rests solely on
the merchant;"' merchants are responsible for conforming their credit in-
struments to the new Rule. Subsequent holders are not required to comply
with the Rule in its present form. Therefore, a subsequent holder's failure to
check the consumer credit instrument for the requisite notice provision will
not expose him to FFC sanctions.8 2
Not all sales transactions are consumer transactions within the meaning
of the Rule. A "consumer" is defined by the Rule as "a natural person who
seeks or acquires goods or services for personal, family, or household
use." 8 3 Most consumer purchases, such as automobiles and appliances for
personal or family use, fall within this, definition. Consumer credit purchases
of services, such as home remodeling, health spa membership, and educa-
tional services to individuals for nonbusiness purposes are also within the
definition. The Rule is limited in its application to transactions involving




81. Hearings on the FTC Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Preservation of Consumer
Claims and Defenses Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (statement of
Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection).
82. It may, however, expose him to charges of bad faith. See text accompanying note 60
supra.
83. 16 C.F.R. §433.1(b) (1977).
[Vol. 27:977
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE
considered to be within that category.84 In addition, certain limitations of
the Truth in Lending Act8s5 and Trade Regulation Z86 are incorporated into
the Rule.87 As a result of the Truth in Lending Act, consumer transactions,
including expenditures made for public utilities88 or totalling more than
$25,000,89 are not affected by the Rule. Moreover, only "credit sale" lease
agreements 90 under Trade Regulation Z are within the Rule's scope. Sales
contracts for goods or services to commercial buyers are excluded from the
Rule, 91 as are contractual purchases by business entities and purchases of
production and agricultural equipment.
2. Extent of a Holder's Liability Under the Rule
According to the FTC interpretation of the Rule, a subsequent holder's
liability is limited to the total amount paid by the consumer pursuant to the
credit contract.92  For example, when a consumer who has purchased a five
thousand dollar automobile pays three thousand dollars before becoming
aware of a fraudulent misrepresentation, the consumer is only entitled to a
recovery of the three thousand dollars. If a subsequent holder seeks to col-
lect the two thousand dollars remaining under the terms of the contract, the
consumer may assert a right not to pay the balance on the basis of his de-
fense against the merchant. The limitation on the amount of a consumer's
total recovery does not foreclose any local, state, or federal statutory right of
the consumer;9 3 it merely limits recovery resulting from failure to observe
the notice provision.
84. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 9. The FTC explained that the realty and security
exemption is not always guaranteed: "[T]he mere fact that a security interest in real property is
taken does not mean that the sales transaction does not involve consumer goods or services."
Id.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 160L-05 (1970).
86. Regulation Z of the Federal Reserve Board codifies the regulations issued by the Board
pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act and the Consumer Credit Protection Act. 12 C.F.R. §
226 (1976).
87. The definition of "purchase money loan" and "financing a sale" rely on interpretations of
certain terms found in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(d)-.1(e)
(1977).
88. The Truth in Lending Act exempts "[t]ransactions under public utility tariffs, if the
Board determines that a State regulatory body regulates the charges for the public utility ser-
vices .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1603(4) (1970).
89. The Truth in Lending Act exempts "Credit transactions, other than real property trans-
actions, in which the total amount to be financed exceeds $25,000." 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3) (1970).
90. Regulation Z applies to leases in which the lessee pledges to tender as compensation for
use an amount "substantially equivalent to or in excess of the aggregate value of the property
... involved." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(t) (1976).
91. See note 84 supra. This is further evidence of the FTC's intent to retain the holder in
due course doctrine in nonconsumer commercia transactions. See note 52 supra.
92. The Rule's operative terminology is found in the last sentence of the prescribed notice:
"Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder."
16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a),(b).
93. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 7.
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A consumer who has been damaged as a result of a merchant's miscon-
duct, therefore, has two courses of action available to him: he may sue the
holder on breach of warranty to liquidate the remaining balance owed the
subsequent holder and recover the money paid under the contract, or he
may defend against the subsequent holder's action to collect the unpaid bal-
ance.9 4 The Rule is silent as to the consumer's ability to recover interest
and attorney fees incurred in a suit arising from the underlying consumer
transaction. It can be implied from the FTC's Staff Guidelines that the re-
covery of these expenses is governed by the appropriate decisions and rules
in each jurisdiction.9 5
The Rule does not create any new consumers' rights or defenses; it
merely expands the opportunities for raising them. The legitimacy of the
consumer's claim or defense is still dictated by the appropriate statutes and
decisions in each jurisdiction. To illustrate, a consumer who buys a nonwar-
ranty item has no warranty claim or defense and the Rule does not supply
him one. Furthermore, the FTC noted in its staff guidelines that "the perti-
nent rules of law and equity, including rules of evidence, procedure and
statutes of limitations, will continue to apply." 9 6
3. Purchase Money Loans-Seller's Burden
When a valid purchase money loan relationship exists, 97 the merchant
must request that the creditor insert the notice in the financing agreement.
The creditor, at the present time, is not legally required to include the
notice. In the future, however, if the pending amendment to the Rule is
adopted, 98 creditors may be required to insert the notice. If the creditor
does not insert the notice in his contract, the merchant is faced with two
alternatives: complete the transaction in violation of the Rule and risk a pen-
alty,9 9 or refuse to complete the transaction and sacrifice a sale.
The creditor, on the other hand, is forced to analyze most consumer-
related situations and determine if it is profitable to assume the added risk
that accompanies the notice. This determination will certainly include a
close scrutiny of the merchant to ascertain his responsibility and dependabil-
ity. The creditor then must choose a course of action from among the follow-
ing, considering the corresponding result of each:
94. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
95. See text accompanying note 96 infra.
96. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 7.
97. See text accompanying notes 63-80 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 116-17 infra.
99. See text accompanying notes 104-06 infra.
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(1) Exclude the notice. This could result in the cancellation of the
loan by a wary consumer, or the refusal to complete the transaction
by a hesitant merchant.
(2) Include the notice. The creditor then becomes the ultimate
guarantor of the item.
(3) Include the notice with a collateral agreement, whereby the mer-
chant indemnifies the creditor against liability for any damages.
Creditors not desiring to limit their credit markets will follow this third
course of action and enter into "hold harmless" agreementsloo with mer-
chants. The value of this type of agreement depends upon the responsible
character and financial status of the merchant,10 1 since a credit institution
would be assured no protection from a financially unstable merchant who
would default on the agreement if the creditor should attempt to collect
from the merchant after a consumer had asserted his claims.
D. Risk of Noncompliance
1. FTC Enforcement
For many years the FTC lacked the authority to penalize effectively vio-
lators of its regulations. 10 2  Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, the FTC was merely empowered to ban "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices." 1 0 3 Recently, however, the FTC has been delegated increased
enforcement responsibility for consumer oriented legislation.10 4 The FTC
may now impose sanctions and/or a monetary penalty for violation of its
regulations. 105
100. The following is a typical recourse agreement:
Seller agrees to indemnify and hold Creditor harmless from any loss and any attor-
ney's fees and any other expenses incurred as a result of any claim or defense
against Creditor arising either by virtue of the prescribed notice being placed on
the debt instrument or from the goods or services sold by Seller to the Borrower.
101. Like the HDC doctrine, hold harmless agreements, and their predecessor repurchase
agreements, insulate creditors from consumer defenses. However, if the seller breaches either
type of agreement, the consumer can still assert his defenses against the creditor. As a result,
even withhold harmless agreements, creditors are unlikely to purchase the seller's paper unless
the seller is in a relatively stable financial condition. See generally, Note, A Case Study of the
Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-off Period, 78
YALE L.J. 618, 640 (1969).
102. See Comment, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-Unfairness to Consum-
ers, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1071. For a strident criticism of the FTC failure to adopt an active role
in consumer protection before 1970, see ABA CoMM. TO STUDY THE FTC, A CRniQUE OF THE
CONSUmR PROTECTION RECORD OF THE FTC (1969).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970) (amended 1975).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. V--975).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 45(0, (m) (Supp. V 1975).
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The FTC is responsible for enforcing the HDC Rule against merchants
who violate its provisions. The FTC may impose, among other things, a
$10,000 fine per day per violation on merchants who fail to include the
requisite notice in their consumer credit sales contracts, or are parties to a
purchase money loan contract which excludes the notice. Presently, only
merchants are penalized, 10 6 but adoption of the proposed amendment would
subject creditors to the penalty for failure to include the notice in direct loan
instruments for purchase money loans.' 0 7
2. Private Right of Action
The HDC Rule also exposes sellers to potential private legal action by
individual consumers. Although federal courts previously had held that no
private right of action could be implied from the FTC Act,' 08 a federal dis-
trict court in Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest ' 0 9 has set a prece-
dent 110 by permitting private individuals the right to seek relief from a mer-
chant whose unfair or deceptive trade practices violate the FTC Act. In
Guernsey, two consumers filed an action seeking injunctive relief as well as
compensatory damages against a seller of a freezer food plan who allegedly
violated the FTC Rule by committing certain fraudulent acts. The defendant
moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the FTC Act did not contain a
private enforcement provision. The court denied the motion to dismiss, and
thereby supported the private litigants' right to assert a legal claim under
the FTC Act, because
[t]here is no legislative intent that the Federal Trade Commission
was to have "exclusive" jurisdiction. To infer that once the Federal
Trade Commission has entered a case and enforced compliance
with the Act, that subsequent private consumer actions would frus-
trate the purposes of the Act would deny consumers who were
victimized by further violations any recovery."'
Under the reasoning of Guernsey, not only would merchants who
exclude the notice from consumer credit instruments risk FTC enforcement,
they would also expose themselves to private actions seeking relief under
the HDC Rule. Consumers could initiate suits in federal courts against mer-
106. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 116-18 infra.
108. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
109. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976). The court in Guernsey was the first to hold that a
private right of action exists pursuant to the FTC Act.
110. Since 1914, the Federal Trade Commission has been solely responsible for enforcing the
provisions of the Act. See Comment, Private Enforcement and Rulemaking Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act: Expansion of FTC, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 462 (1974).
111. 408 F. Supp. at 588.
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chants who excluded the prescribed notice in consumer credit contracts and
purchase money loan agreements, since the terms of the Rule make such
exclusion an unfair or deceptive practice. Nonetheless, recovery of compen-
satory or punitive damages by the consumer would be limited by the Rule's
express recovery provision1 12 to the amount that he had already paid.
However, merchants subject to private lawsuits in states with statutes
patterned on the FTC Act would face higher damage claims because of this
exposure to private litigation.1 1 3 Many state courts are specifically advised
by their respective "mini-FTC Act" statutes to follow the FTC and federal
courts' interpretation of the FTC Act in construing their state statute,11 4 but
damages and penalties are governed by the individual state statute. Con-
sumers in states with such "mini-FTC Act" statutes can even recover treble
damages, costs, and attorney's fees for "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices." 115
In addition to merchants, the Rule exposes subsequent holders to legal
actions that they would not have been exposed to if the HDC doctrine were
applicable. Subsequent holders of consumer paper now have actual or con-
structive notice of possible claims and defenses, and therefore are exposed to
actions that the consumer might have had against the original merchant. The
impact of this development on the consumer market is substantial. Because
subsequent holders may be deluged by consumer claims, legal costs in-
curred by subsequent holders in handling such claims will increase the cost
of making consumer loans. This added cost of doing business will either be
passed directly to the consumer in the form of higher prices or indirectly
through reduction of the volume of consumer credit.
Another significant practical problem is created by the establishment of a
private cause of action (based on Guernsey) without a provision for the or-
dering of claims. For example, a consumer who purchased a defective
freezer from a merchant who then discounted the consumer's note to a bank
could either stop paying on his note until the defect was repaired, or pursue
one of two causes of action under the HDC Rule: one against the merchant
for a breach of warranty, the other against the bank under the same theory
by operation of the Rule. Nothing in the Rule prevents the consumer from
asserting his claim against the bank without attempting to seek relief from
the merchant. As a result, the bank would effectively become the original
warrantor of the freezer. However, the Rule's purpose was not to make sub-
112. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
113. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-2 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975); S.C.
CODE § 66.71 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (Supp. 1974).
114. See HAw. REv. STAT. § 480-3 (1968); S.C. CODE § 66.71.1(b) (Supp. 1975); TEX. Bus.
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (c) (Vernon Supp. 1976).
115. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 430-13 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16, -16.1 (1975);
S.C. CODE § 66-71.13 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE §19.86.090 (Supp. 1975).
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sequent holders of consumer credit paper the warrantors of goods and ser-
vices. Its purpose was to make subsequent holders responsible for goods and
services only when a merchant's failure to adequately remedy the problem
combined with the operation of the HDC doctrine would result in an in-
equity to the consumer. The Rule should be clarified by the inclusion of a
provision requiring a consumer to exhaust his available remedies against the
original merchant before raising an action against a subsequent holder.
E. Proposed Amendment
Simultaneously with the promulgation of the Rule, the FTC proposed an
amendment which adds the word "creditor" to "seller" in defining who must
include the prescribed notice. 116 Adoption of this amendment would create
additional problems in consumer financing. An independent creditor would
himself be obligated to determine whether the proceeds of a loan are to be
used for a consumer contract. A creditor confronted with a purchase money
loan situation would have to either insert the required notice in the debt
instrument and assume the obligation to the consumer, not insert the notice
and thereby be in violation of the Rule, or not grant the loan to the con-
sumer. To date, there has been limited activity regarding the proposed
amendment.117 It appears that the FTC has adopted a more cautious wait-
and-see attitude in respect to the amendment in view of the Congressional
criticism prompted by the enactment of the initial HDC Rule.' 1 8
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM
THE HDC RULE
A. Defects In The Rule's Application
1. Purchase Money Loans
Two problems arise from the purchase money loan provision of the FTC
Rule which warrant consideration. First, what is the effect of the Rule on
116. The proposed amended HDC Rule makes it an unfair or deceptive trade practice for a
seller or a creditor to directly or indirectly execute a consumer credit contract which does not
contain the notice prescribed in the original Rule. See note 55 supra, and the proposed
amendment to FTC Trade Regulation Rule on Preservation of Consumer's Claims and De-
fenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53,530 (1975).
117. The cautious outlook that the FTC has towards the pending amendment is reflected in
the statement of Margery Waxman Smith, Acting Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion: "The Commission has proposed an amendment which would apply the rule to creditors,
but it recognizes that the situations are not identical and that many issues must be analyzed
before a decision. on any such extension is made." Hearings on the FTC Regulation Rule Con-
cerning the Preservation of Consumer Claims and Defenses Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 9 (1976).
118. See notes 161-65 infra and accompanying text.
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open-end credit transactions? Second, how can the merchant tell if he is
being paid by a purchase money loan?
The view taken by the FTC is that the specific purchase requirement is
"implicit in the definition of 'Purchase money loan' " 119 and in effect
exempts most open-end credit transactions. This interpretation appears to
afford unscrupulous creditors an opportunity to arrange a credit contract in
the form of an open-end credit transaction solely to evade this Rule. The
FTC, foreseeing such a possibility, has stated that the substance of the
transaction will control, not its form.120 The consumer's receipt of a portion
of the loan proceeds does not place the transaction within the purchase
money loan section of the Rule. The FTC's test is "whether the loan is
applied in whole or substantial part" to a particular purchase. 12 1
The application of the "whole" criterion to a credit transaction is under-
standable, but the "substantial part" criterion causes additional uncertainty.
Although the FTC felt this qualification was necessary to prevent avoidance
of the Rule by creditors who loaned a consumer a small sum of money in
excess of the purchase price, the "substantial" criterion is itself quite vague
and the FTC has not provided interpretive guidelines. One way to correct
this ambiguity would be to apply a definite percentage test to purchase
money loans. For example, if the standard were set at 75%, any loan in
which more than 75% of the money was used for a consumer credit purchase
would be covered by the Rule. *Since a set percentage, like most static stan-
dards, could be manipulated by creditors to avoid the Rule, the test would
be most useful if it were used to establish a prima facie violation of the Rule.
In cases where the percentage standard was not met, the FTC or the con-
sumer would bear the burden of proving the "substantial" criterion.
The second problem created by the purchase money loan provision con-
cerns the merchant's determination of the source of a consumer's money.
Since in purchase money loan situations the contract is between a consumer
and an independent creditor, the merchant may not be able to determine
that the money he is accepting is a purchase money loan. This inability to
determine the loan's source will be of particular importance when the mer-
chant and creditor are generally affiliated or involved in a referral relation-
ship but in the particular instance the consumer approached the creditor
without having been referred by the merchant. The FTC has determined
that if the objective circumstances surrounding the transaction "do not indi-
cate the source of the proceeds or do not provide reason to believe that the
proceeds may be from a 'purchase money loan,' there is no obligation to
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further investigate the source." 1 2 2  Unfortunately for consumers, merchants
can avoid the application of the purchase money loan provision by remaining
uninformed of the circumstances surrounding the transaction since there is
no duty of inquiry. By requiring consumers to pay for products with cash or
personal checks instead of joint proceeds checks from a bank, the merchant
can avoid receiving notice of the instrument's purchase money loan origin.
Certainly, the HDC Rule makes ignorance desirable for both merchants and
independent creditors.
2. Ambiguous Terminology
Some of the Rule's terms lack explicit legal definition so that many prob-
lems of interpretation remain for the courts. The term "refers," which is a
key to the application of the Rule, is undefined, although the FTC has indi-
cated standards for its application.1 2 3  Consequently, it is questionable
whether a merchant may be said to have referred consumers to a creditor if
he mentioned the creditor's name in response to inquiries by buyers re-
questing reputable credit sources. It is also questionable whether a mer-
chant could be deemed to have referred consumers to the creditor if he
merely furnished a list of reputable credit sources to the consumer.
The term "common control" is also undefined. Application of the Rule is
not expressly limited to situations where common control is exercisable by
an active participant in both the retail and credit businesses. For example, if
an automobile salesman is also a member of a local credit union, it could be
argued that the automobile dealership and the credit union are in a common
control relationship despite the fact that the salesman may never have di-
rected credit buyers to the credit union. Common control might also be
inferred between an appliance distributor and a local savings and loan be-
cause of a common member of their respective boards of directors. This
assertion of common control could be made despite the fact that the board
member did not play a direct or active role in the consumer affairs of either
business and the consumer credit transaction did not arise pursuant to his
duties to either business. Characterizing such tenuous relationships as com-
mon control relationships within the meaning of the Rule could have a stifl-
ing impact upon the consumer credit business community.
The FTC could resolve the problems resulting from these undefined
terms by issuing more explicit definitions. Until the FTC decides how much
protection consumers require in the common control situations and issues
definitions accordingly, the courts must look to traditional case law tests in
122. 41 Fed. Reg. 34,596-97 (1976).
123. See notes 75-77 supra.
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this area, such as the "close connectedness" test,12 4 for guidance in deter-
mining the intimacy of a relationshp between merchant and creditor.
B. The Preemption Dilemma
Serious controversy has arisen over the FTC's authority to issue a rule
that preempts a substantial number of state statutes.125  Although most
states have limited the scope of the HDC doctrine,12 6 the majority have
statutes which expressly permit some form of limitation on consumers' right
to assert claims and defenses against subsequent holders which they could
assert against the merchants who sold them the goods. 1 27 The HDC Rule
prohibits any such limitation on consumers' rights.' 28  Therefore, application
of the FTC Rule will effectively preempt state statutory schemes that sanc-
tion a limited HDC doctrine in consumer transactions.
There are two schools of thought on the FTC's authority to promulgate
rules which preempt state law. Those favoring state autonomy reject the
theory that an administrative agency rule can preempt state statutes. 1 29
Those supporting the FTC Rule do so hoping that federal legislation will
correct the present inequities created by diverse state statutes; consumers
are highly protected in some states, but totally unprotected in others.' 3 0
The commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce by means of regulatory devices such as the FTC. The Commission
has the power under its enabling act to adopt trade rules if it follows certain
requisite administrative procedures. However, the permissible substance of
those rules is open to question. The key question is whether Congress,
through its passage of the Magnuson-Moss-FTC Improvement Act,' 3 ' in-
tended to give the FTC the power to preempt state laws.' 32
In the FTC Improvement Act, Congress changed the rulemaking proce-
dure and jurisdictional provisions to broaden FTC authority over matters "in
124. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
125. William J. O'Connor, Jr., speaking before the Committee on the Uniform Commercial
Code of the ABA Corporation Banking and Business Law Section, warned that "'the restrictions
on the holder in due course doctrine imposed by some 45 states are now completely pre-
empted by the FTC Rule," 45 U.S.L.W. 2097 (August 24, 1976).
126. For a synopsis of state legislation in this area, see generally C.C.H. CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE 4380, 4390 (1969).
127. See generally, Hogan, A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation, 44 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 38 (1958); Willier, Protection Instalment Buyers Didn't Get, 2 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REv. 287 (1961).
128. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
129. See generally, Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the Federal Trade Commission, 76-2
DUKE L.J. 225, 227-29 (1976).
130. See note 45 supra.
131. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
132. See W. GELLHORN AND C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw 732 (6th ed. 1974).
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or affecting" commerce. 133  Although the FTC Improvement Act expanded
the agency's powers, Congress was apprehensive that the enhanced author-
ity might lead to blanket preemption of state statutory and judicial schemes
of consumer protection. An examination of the legislative history of the FTC
Improvement Act also reveals that Congress did not intend to grant the FTC
the broad power to "occupy the field." 134  The committee report accom-
panying the FTC Improvement Act specifically states:
The expansion of the FTC's jurisdiction . . . is not intended to
occupy the field or in any way to preempt State or local agencies
from carrying out consumer protection or other activities within
their jurisdiction which are also within the expanded jurisdiction of
the Commission. 13 5
An earlier Senate report also reflects the legislative intent to limit FTC
power:
In considering certain arguments against expansion of the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, the Committee was mindful of the danger of
making the Commission alone responsible for eradicating fraud and
deceit in every corner of the marketplace. This is not the Commit-
tee's intent in expanding the jurisdiction of the Commission. State
and local consumer protection efforts are not to be supplanted by
this expansion of jurisdiction. 136
This legislative history indicates that .Congress could not have intended to
give the FTC the power to totally abolish the respective distinctions and
limitations of individual state consumer statutes which deal with the HDC
doctrine.
Furthermore, the FTC, in its interpretation of the HDC Rule, ackfiowl-
edges its limited authority. The Staff Guidelines accompanying the Rule
state that the Rule does not "eliminate any other rights that the consumer
133. The Supreme Court had previously declared that only a congressional amendment could
expand the scope of the FTC Act. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). Cf. Ward Baking
Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 330 (2d Cir. 1920); Winslow v. FTC, 277 F. 206 (4th Cir. 1921) (restricting
FTC authority to interstate commerce).
134. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7726, is illustrative of this intent:
The expansion of the FTC's jurisdiction made by this section 201 is not intended
to occupy the field or in any way to preempt State or local agencies from carrying
out consumer protection or other activities within their jurisdiction which are also
within the expanded jurisdiction of the Commission.
Where cases of consumer fraud of a local nature which affect commerce are being
effectively dealt with b State and local government agencies, it is the Committee's
intent that the Federal Trade Commission should not intrude.
135. Id.
136. S. REP. No. 151, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1973).
[Vol. 27:9771002
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE RULE
may have as a matter of local, state, or Federal statute." 137 However, the
House report implied that the FTC power is only limited by state statutes
that are consistent with the FTC Rule. The House report further stated that
"[w]here cases of consumer fraud ofa local nature which affect commerce
are being effectively dealt with by the State or local government agencies,
... the Federal Trade Commission should not intrude." 138 This statement
suggests that the FTC Rule can only preempt state laws that fail to effec-
tively deal with the HDC problem. The Senate report also implies that the
FTC has the authority to preempt state statutes that are not within the
expanded jurisdiction of the Commission. The view of the expanded jurisdic-
tion taken by both the House and the Senate in effect gives the states mar-
ginal authority to promulgate statutes that do not conform to the FTC Rule.
As a corollary, it implies that an FTC Rule can occupy the field in those
states which have no statutory scheme concerning the subject matter of the
Rule. If Congress did not intend to permit FTC rulemaking to preempt
conflicting state statutes, then the HDC Rule was passed without authority
by the FTC. On the other hand, if Congress intended to give the FTC the
power to expand upon state consumer laws or to preempt conflicting state
statutes, such power must have been predicated on the additional, stricter
procedural guidelines prescribed by the FTC Improvement Act, which
minimize the damage that such a rule would cause to the federal-state bal-
ance. For this reason the procedural process used by the FTC to promulgate
the HDC Rule merits consideration.
C. The Question of Procedural Propriety
The FTC Improvement Act revoked the Commission's power to enact
trade regulation rules through the use of more lenient procedures which had
been recognized previously as valid by the courts.139 The pre-Improvement
Act procedures merely required publication of the rule. Interested parties
were granted the right to participate "through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." 140
The FTC Improvement Act, although it granted the FTC expanded powers
to promulgate rules for consumer protection, 141 subjected this power to
more stringent procedural safeguards and granted interested parties the fol-
lowing additional rights: (1) "to submit written data, views and arguments
137. STAFF GUIDELINES, supra note 51, at 7.
138. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 7702, 7726.
139. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 951 (1974).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 553 (1970) (amended 1975).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (Supp. V. 1975). See also Verkuil, supra note 129.
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[and to have] all such submissions publicly available;" 142  (2) to present
their positions both orally and by documentary submission, during rulemak-
ing hearings;143 and (3) to cross-examine all persons who submit "oral or
written testimony." 144
An exemption in the FTC Improvement Act, however, permitted the
FTC to continue promulgation of rules under pre-Improvement Act proce-
dures where the presentation of data, views, and arguments regarding a rule
proposed under pre-Improvement Act standards was "substantially com-
pleted." 145 The FTC, having already maintained several hearings on the
proposed HDC Rule prior to the adoption of the FTC Improvement Act,
promulgated the Rule under this exception.
If the HDC Rule, which is extremely broad and preempts most state
approaches to this problem, is considered to fall under the exception, the
result will be incongruous. Promulgation of the HDC Rule under the Im-
provement Act exception is inconsistent with congressional purpose. It is
clear that Congress implemented the more strict Improvement Act proce-
dures to insure careful analysis with public participation before such a radi-
cal result could occur. The intent of the Congress that passed the Improve-
ment Act could not have been served by preemption of state laws by a rule
promulgated under the lenient pre-Improvement Act procedures.
Although a review of the legislative history of the Improvement Act pro-
vides no clear indication of the intent of Congress regarding the HDC Rule
specifically, a federal district court in National Automobile Dealers Assoc. v.
FTC146 appears to have upheld in dicta the legitimacy of procedures utilized
by the FTC in. promulgating the Rule. This result may not be entirely de-
terminative because the court only focused on whether the procedures con-
formed to the procedural exception of the Improvement Act, not whether an
FTC rule promulgated under these less restrictive procedures could
preempt state law. Because the case was dismissed by the federal court in
Louisiana for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 147 (since the Improvement
Act requires all appeals of FTC Rules be filed in the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit), it is impossible to use the discussion as
precedent. 148 The case neither resolves the problem of reconciling the pro-
cedural exception of the Improvement Act with the congressional require-
ment that preemptive FTC rules be adopted according to the stricter pro-
142. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2) (Supp. V. 1975).
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a(b)(3), (c)(1)(2) (Supp. V. 1975).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V. 1975).
146. 421 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. La. 1976).
147. Id. at 35.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(1)(A), (e)(5)(B) (Supp. V. 1975).
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cedural requirements of that Act, nor provides a judicial determination of
the constitutionality of the HDC Rule. Speculation regarding the FTC's au-
thority to promulgate the Rule remains, leaving the Rule open to challenge.
D. Creditors' Tort Liability
The terminology of the notification that must be included in all consumer
credit instruments exposes creditors to "all claims and defenses which the
debtor could assert against the seller."1 49 This language could be inter-
preted, to expose subsequent holders of consumer credit instruments to tort
liability claims, including personal injury and property damage caused by
defective merchandise, as well as to warranty claims. The result would be
that a consumer who had a valid product liability claim against the mer-
chant under state law could defeat a subsequent holder's right to further
payments and recover damages for his injury equal to the amount paid on
the contract by the consumer 1 50 by asserting his claim against the
holder.151 Furthermore, express disclaimers of tort liability in a consumer
credit instrument may not be adequate to limit the subsequent holder's tort
liability because the Rule prohibits the qualification of any rights preserved
by the notice provision by any other recital in the instrument.
The FTC has not explained its failure to follow the precedent established
in the Truth in Lending Act Regulations, where the Federal Reserve Board
specifically exempted credit card issuers from tort claims resulting from de-
fective merchandise purchased with a credit card. 152 Tort claims by a con-
sumer against a subsequent holder could be supported by none of the com-
mon policies which support such recovery against the seller. To prevent
unjustified claims, the FTC should amend the Rule to include a tort claim
exemption clause restricting subsequent holders' liability to purely contrac-
tual claims.
E. Curtailment in the Availability of Consumer Credit
Preservation of consumer claims and defenses may reduce the availability
of consumer credit. As subsequent holders become more conservative about
the consumer credit paper they purchase, merchants whose product line
consists of lower quality goods will find it difficult to obtain credit for their
customers and thus may be forced out of business. In most instances these
customers will be lower income people who could not afford the same pro-
149. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1977).
150. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
151. The magnitude of subsequent holders' tort liability under the Rule has not yet been
tested.
152. 12 C.F.R. § 226.13(i) (1977).
10051977]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
duct if forced to purchase only more expensive, higher quality goods. 153 In
addition, curtailment of available credit sources may also reduce the degree
of competition in consumer credit financing and lead to an increase in the
cost of consumer credit. 154
The economic effects of the HDC Rule will be felt not only on the mi-
croeconomic level by the individual consumer, but also on the mac-
roeconomic level by the national economy. The United States has become a
"credit society."1 55  Since 1950 the population has grown at a 44% rate
while the outstanding consumer debt rate "has multiplied more than tvelve
times." 156 What effect will the HDC Rule, which predictions say will re-
duce the volume of credit on a micro level, have on the macro level? In a
statement before the House Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing
on July 27, 1976, Dr. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, referring to the HDC Rule, predicted:
It may well be reducing somewhat the availability of credit to con-
sumers and some retailers at the very time when a continued
strong rise of consumer spending is needed to foster further gains
in production and employment. 157
Although it is too early to gauge precisely the long-term macroeconomic
effects of the Rule on our "credit society," an interim study by the Wharton
Forecasting Institute has estimated that the Rule resulted in a 5.5% reduc-
tion in consumer credit in 1976.158 The HDC Rule has already created
additional expenses for members of the retail and finance industries. Addi-
tional reviewing procedures, legal consultation fees, and printing costs have
added to their operational expenses. These costs will be passed on to con-
sumers through higher interest rates. The overall economic impact of the
Rule will be felt most by consumers with lower incomes since they can ill
afford to carry this increased cost.
To assess the merits of the HDC Rule, the burden of less available and
more expensive credit must be balanced against the benefits that the Rule
affords. Despite the fact that the Rule may make it more difficult for lower
income individuals to obtain credit, many authorities favor the Rule as a
153. A coordinate effect may be to aid producers of less expensive, inferior quality goods by
increasing their sales.
154. Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market for Con-
sumer Installment Credit, 33 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 762 (1968).
155. TIME, Feb. 28, 1977, at 36. The author noted that "an insistence on buying only what
can be paid for in cash seems as outmoded as a crew cut." Id.
156. Id.
157. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) (Statement of the
Honorable Albert W. Johnson of Pennsylvania).
158. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1976, § L, at 81, col. 2.
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much needed protective device for consumers, particularly those with lower
income.' 5 9 As one commentator stated:
The buyer who is being protected by retail installment legislation
is normally one who cannot afford the luxury of a lawsuit and may,
therefore, be forced as a practical matter to submit to the demands
of the financing agency though he has an otherwise valid claim.' 60
The ultimate determination of who shall bear the risks in consumer
credit transactions remains one of policy. However, additional economic
studies of the Rule's impact are necessary in order to best maintain a bal-
ance between protection of consumers' claims and their credit needs.
F. Pending Legislative Solutions
Federal legislative activity opposing the HDC Rule surfaced immediately
after the Rule went into effect.' 6 ' Two pending bills attempt to deal with
the Rule. Senate Bill 3652,162 introduced in July, 1976, would amend the
Consumer Credit Protection Act163 by restoring the HDC doctrine, reserv-
ing to the states the power to preempt this Federal law and abolish the
HDC doctrine in consumer affairs. If enacted into law, this bill would effec-
tively eradicate the FTC Rule, and place the states in the same position they
were before the Rule's issuance. It also would reserve to Congress, rather
than the FTC, the right to pass a substantive federal statute to abrogate the
HDC doctrine in consumer credit transactions at a future time.
A congressional resolution16 that is currently pending in the House of
Representatives would require a reexamination of the HDC Rule under the
stricter procedural requirements of the FTC Improvement Act. If enacted
into law, this Resolution would suspend the HDC Rule until the results of a
General Accounting Office study on the Rule's effect on the consumers'
credit market is completed. 1 65  Once this information is available, the legis-
159. See Hartmand & Walker, The Holder in Due Course Doctrine and the Consumer, 77
CoM. L.J. 116, 123-24 (1972); Project, Legislative Regulation of Retail Installment Financing, 7
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 623, 750 (1960).
160. Project, supra note 159, at 750.
161. Within 60 days of the Rule's effective date, both the Senate and the House were con-
templating resolutions to abolish the FTC Rule. See text accompanying notes 162-65 infra.
162. S. 3652, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CoNe. Rec. 11412 (1976).
163. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
164. H.R. 15082, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Rec. 8467 (1976). Representatives
Broyhill, McCollister, and Johnson introduced the bill on August 15, 1976. This bill was re-
ferred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
165. The passage of the HDC Rule under the old procedural requirements may have led to a
failure to fully investigate the economic effects of the Rule. This is another reason why the Rule
should be reissued under the new, stricter procedural guidelines.
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lation would require the FTC to review the data and reevaluate the Rule
under the procedural guidelines of the Improvement Act.
The Senate proposal, if adopted, would not fill the need for a uniform,
national regulation to alleviate the problems created by the application of
the HDC doctrine to consumer transactions; rather, the bill would protect
each state's right to deal with the HDC doctrine individually. If the bill
required states to promulgate their respective statutes pursuant to a nation-
ally approved standard, this defect could be alleviated. At best, however,
the proposal as it stands would leave the states in the position they were in
before the HDC Rule, but would fail to offer consumers any additional pro-
tection.
In contrast, the House resolution provides an equitable solution to the
controversy over the scope of the Rule's application and the authority under
which it was promulgated. The GAO study will offer statistical evidence of
the Rule's impact. Furthermore, reevaluation of the Rule under the stricter
procedural guidelines of the FTC Improvement Act would provide ample
opportunity for affected parties to participate. This reassessment under new
rulemaking procedures would assure compliance with the congressional per-
ception that FTC rules may preempt conflicting state laws when promul-
gated under the procedural guidelines prescribed by the FTC Improvement
Act.
In the interim, additional guidelines, more precise definitions of the
Rule's terminology, and a second statement of the FTC's enforcement policy
(especially fines and warnings for first offenders) would be useful. The FTC
should also suspend its activity concerning the proposed amendments to the
Rule until the problems with the original Rule are resolved.
V. CONCLUSION
The FTC's effort to protect consumers from those who sell defective
merchandise and slipshod services on credit terms is laudable. But, the
FTC, in its zealous efforts to resolve consumer problems created by the
HDC doctrine, has created certain problems that now must be solved if the
Rule is to be effective.
The confusion created by the Rule's vague language, undefined terms,
and incomplete guidelines can be readily solved by the FTC through the
issuance of additional definitions and guidelines. The preemption -question,
however, cannot be resolved so readily. The FTC's authority to preempt
state statutes which are incompatible with the HDC Rule remains an open
question as a result of the inconsistency between the procedural exception to
the FTC Improvement Act and the Congressional intent to protect the bal-
ance of federalism through the coupling of expanded FTC power with strict-
er procedural standards.
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In view of this issue and the other serious problems which have been
raised, careful review of the HDC Rule and the facts surrounding its pro-
mulgation is necessary. Congress has within its authority the power to per-
manently resolve these issues. Because of the intricacies involved, the pend-
ing House Resolution to suspend the rule until further studies can be made
is the most logical iimmediate solution.
Meanwhile, the HDC doctrine will remain inoperative in most consumer
credit transactions. As a result, subsequent holders of consumer paper and
independent creditors will continue to be more selective in their consumer
loan commitments. The traditional legal axiom caveat emptor has been re-
placed in consumer credit transactions with a new warning-caveat posses-
sor.
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